A real-world input problem

The contract never saw the request.

So why should it trust the result?

browser untrusted

HTTPS solves transport

Secure connection.

✓ Server authenticated
✓ Response encrypted
✓ Transit integrity

But the contract has

zero evidence.

Browserclient-controlled

HTTPSsecure transport

Reclaimnot reached

2 of 3not reached

Midnightnot reached

The browser is not a trust boundary

A genuine response and an invented value can look identical.

API

genuine response

{ }

invented value

Compact cannot tell

The problem is provenance, not transport.

zkFetch + self-hosted Reclaim attestor

Make the interaction verifiable.

GET strava.com real HTTPS request

Reclaim witnesses the TLS interaction

PROOF server + response independently verifiable

Browserrequest

HTTPSauthenticated

Reclaimproof artifacts

2 of 3next

Midnightlater

The compatibility gap

Two proof systems.
No native verifier.

Reclaim external proof

≠ not natively
verifiable

Compact Midnight circuit

We need a translation layer.

The verification bridge

Verify once per notary.
Sign one typed assertion.

RECLAIM ARTIFACT captured Strava response proof · host · required fields

N1verifysign

N2verifysign

N3verifysign

ASSERTION v1

distance · moving_time
timestamp · nonce

Today: notaries temporarily see the captured response. Next: Reclaim redaction reveals only required fields.

Each notary receives the current Reclaim artifact, including the captured Strava response, and independently verifies it using Reclaim's own code. It checks the proof, the expected host, and the required fields. It then extracts only the permitted metrics, such as distance or moving time, into a small, versioned assertion with a timestamp and a unique nonce. Today, the notaries can temporarily see that API response. Reclaim also supports client-side response redaction, so we can reveal only the fields the assertion requires instead of the full response. Wiring that selective-disclosure path into our notary flow is privacy-hardening work we plan to complete in the coming weeks. The notaries would still see the exact claims they sign, but not unrelated user data. Until then, this is an oracle-style trust boundary, and we make that boundary explicit.

Compact-compatible signatures

Two signatures cross the boundary.

N1valid

N2valid

N3optional

≥ 2 Jubjub-Schnorr exact Compact encoding

✓ accepted

1 compromised signer cannot forge 2 colluding signers can forge

Checkpoint

What we have now

Real HTTPS responsethe browser made the request

Reclaim-verifiedthe interaction is independently checkable

Threshold-signedat least two notaries agree

Ready for Compactno workout on-chain yet

What Midnight adds

A private, replay-resistant credential.

01Threshold≥2 registered signatures

02Freshnesstimestamp window

03Nullifierno replay

04Holder bindingpseudonymous ownership

05Commitmentraw response stays off-ledger

Publiccommitment · nullifier · timestamp · disclosed result

Privateassertion · workout values · holder secret

WitnessFitness

Authenticated web data.
Private contract logic.

Wagersealed until settlement

Badgeprove a threshold, hide the metric

Streakprove continuity, hide the dates

Browser

HTTPS

Reclaim

2 of 3

Midnight

Now let us show the complete path with a real Strava workout.

WitnessFitness is our concrete demonstration of this pipeline. A user authorizes Strava, attests a real workout, obtains signatures from at least two notaries, and registers a holder-bound fitness credential on Midnight. That credential can drive different mechanics. A wager accepts sealed submissions and prevents one credential from being counted twice. In the current implementation, values remain sealed until settlement, when the public payout branch discloses both openings. Badges demonstrate stronger selective disclosure: the circuit proves a distance threshold or streak requirement without revealing the distance, streak count, or workout dates. A user can prove badge ownership to a specific verifier while remaining pseudonymous. The important idea is broader than fitness. We now have a reusable path from authenticated web data to private contract logic: HTTPS establishes the server interaction, Reclaim makes that interaction independently verifiable, the notary threshold translates it into a signature scheme Compact can verify, and Midnight turns the signed claim into a private, replay-resistant credential. In short: do not trust the browser, verify the external interaction, make the trust boundary explicit, and disclose only what the application actually needs. Now let us show that complete path with a real Strava workout.